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Abstract. We build a two-country model of endogenous growth to study the welfare
e¤ects of taxes on tradable primary inputs when countries engage in asymmetric trade.
We obtain explicit links between persistent gaps in productivity growth and the incentives
of resource exporting (importing) countries to subsidize (tax) domestic resource use. The
exportersincentive to subsidize hinges on slower productivity growth and is disconnected
from the importers incentive to tax resource inows  i.e., rent extraction. Moreover,
faster productivity growth exacerbates the importersincentive to tax, beyond the rent-
extraction motive. In a strategic tax game, the only equilibrium is of Stackelberg type and
features, for a wide range of parameter values, positive exporterssubsidies and positive
importerstaxes at the same time.
Keywords: Productivity Gaps, Endogenous Growth, International Trade, Tax Pol-
icy.
JEL Classication Numbers: O40, F43
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1 Introduction
The recent up-surge in oil prices and the growing relevance of primary commodities in
world trade have revived the interest in the international sharing of natural resource rents
(WTO, 2011). Fiscal policies are central to the debate since uncoordinated taxation may
inuence trade outcomes to a great extent, and there are remarkable asymmetries in the
scal treatment of primary resources. In particular, international comparisons between
oil-rich and oil-poor countries reveal that while importers levy oil taxes with varying but
often high rates, most oil exporters grant subsidies on domestic oil consumption (Gupta et
al. 2002; Metschies, 2005). One crucial question is whether asymmetric trade i.e., trade
of primary resources versus nal goods  creates incentives for national governments
to impose strategic domestic taxes. A more specic question is why oil-rich countries
do subsidize domestic oil use  a stylized fact that, beyond mostly political-economic
arguments, is not explained by rst principles like social welfare maximization. In this
paper, we tackle these issues in a two-country model of endogenous growth which draws
an explicit link between persistent gaps in productivity growth and the observed tendency
of resource-exporting (importing) countries to subsidize (tax) domestic consumption of
primary resources.
The incentives behind resource taxation have traditionally been studied in two paral-
lel strands of literature in international trade and in public economics. Bergstrom (1982)
showed that, facing an inelastic world resource supply, importing countries may tax do-
mestic use to extract rents that would otherwise accrue to exporters. The rent-extraction
mechanism is reinforced by the introduction of pollution damages (Amundsen and Schöb,
1999) and monopolistic behavior on the supply side (Brander and Djajic, 1983) since the
importersincentive to tax is stronger the higher the rents to be potentially captured and
the lower the social benet from domestic resource consumption (Rubio and Escriche,
2001; Liski and Tahvonen, 2004). The existing literature on this topic neglects however
two important aspects.
First, the rent-extraction mechanism does not explain why resource-exporting coun-
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tries subsidize domestic resource use. The observed subsidies may reect political conve-
nience e.g. providing benets to well-organized groups (Tornell and Lane, 1999) and
bribing voters (Robinson et al., 2006)  but a clear economic rationale based on rst
principles and standard behavioral assumptions, like the pursuit of maximal social wel-
fare, is still lacking. Second, most analyses of strategic trade policies hinge on partial
equilibrium models that do not consider the role of economic growth and, especially, of
international productivity gaps. In this respect, a number of empirical studies present
cross-country evidence suggesting that specialization in resource production and exports
is negatively correlated to domestic productivity (Lederman and Maloney, 2007). In
particular, Bretschger and Valente (2012) show that oil-exporting countries exhibited
persistently slower growth in labor productivity but constant income levels relative to oil-
importing countries during the last four decades, a plausible reason being the compensat-
ing e¤ects of terms of trade. In this paper, we argue that persistent gaps in productivity
growth inuence the policymakersincentives to distort trade and may provide new ra-
tionales for both the rent-extracting taxes and the defensive subsidies that we observe in
the real world.
We tackle the issue in a two-country model of endogenous growth where asymmet-
ric trade is merged with country-specic engines of economic growth: persistent gaps
in physical productivity between resource-rich and resource-poor economies originate in
di¤erent investment rates since R&D productivity incorporates positive spillovers from
past research. Bretschger and Valente (2012) build this theoretical model to show that
the world equilibrium is characterized by a balanced growth path that is consistent with
the empirical evidence for oil-trading economies: productivity gaps are compensated by
terms-of-trade dynamics implying constant relative incomes between the two economic
areas.1 In the present paper, we extend the analysis of Bretschger and Valente (2012)
in three ways, namely studying (i) the welfare e¤ects of domestic resource taxes, (ii) the
1Persistent productivity gaps are a robust nding of the empirical literature. In endogenous growth
models, one possible justication is limited capability of absorbing foreign innovations due to technological
requirements (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004: Chap.8).
5
selsh incentives of national governments to deviate from laissez-faire, and (iii) strategic
tax games in which exporterssubsidies and importerstaxes can be rationalized as an
equilibrium outcome. Our analysis shows that technological di¤erences determine in-
centives to tax resource ows that are asymmetric for the two countries governments
and are consistent with the observed styilized facts. Specically, suppose that produc-
tivity growth in the resource-importing economy (labeled Home) is faster than in the
resource-exporting country (labeled Foreign). Then, given an initial laissez-faire equi-
librium, Homes government would generate higher domestic welfare by raising positive
taxes on imported resources.2 Instead, the government of Foreign would increase domes-
tic welfare by subsidizing domestic resource use at a strictly positive rate. Combining
these results into a simple strategic tax game, we show that the only equilibrium that
may exist with nite rates is a Stackelberg equilibrium in which the resource exporting
country moves rst. For a wide range of parameter values, the Stackelberg equilibrium
implies the coexistence of positive subsidies in Foreign and positive taxes in Home.
With respect to the existing literature, the element of novelty is that our results
hinge on productivity di¤erences: the traditional rent extraction mechanism, which
is a pure redistribution e¤ect, does not play any role in Foreign government incentive
to subsidize resource use and, at the same time, it is not the exclusive reason behind
Homes government incentive to tax resource inows. Infact, our analysis shows that
resource taxes serve di¤erent purposes in the two economies because:
(a) In the resource-exporting country, rents are maximized when world resource supply
is e¢ ciently allocated between the two countries. Hence, the government of Foreign
has an incentive to use the resource tax to set the two countriesrelative resource
use equal to the e¢ cient level.
(b) In the resource-importing country, the resource tax increases Homes share of world
2This mechanism hinges on the model prediction whereby Home resource taxes increase Homes rel-
ative income share. Bretschger and Valente (2016) provide empirical evidence supporting the positive
relationship between importing countriesresource taxes on their income shares.
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income by reducing the cost share of resource inputs purchased from Foreign rms
i.e., a variant of the rent-extraction mechanism. Therefore, Homes government
has an incentive to use the domestic resource tax to articially reduce Homes share
of world resource use below the e¢ cient level.
In our model, the laissez-faire equilibrium is ine¢ cient because productivity growth
rates are determined by spillovers from past R&D. In particular, when R&D productivity
is faster in the Home country, the equilibrium level of Homes share of world resource
use is strictly above the e¢ cient level3. Combining this result with statements (a) and
(b), it follows that laissez-faire provides both governments with incentives to deviate
from the market equilibrium. On the one hand, Foreign would like to subsidize domestic
resource use in order to raise its own world share up to the e¢ cient level. On the other
hand, Home would like to tax domestic use for two reasons: eliminating its own over-
consumption of world resources (induced by productivity di¤erences) and pushing its
relative resource use further below the e¢ cient level (in order to extract rents). In a
nutshell, the rent-extraction mechanism is logically disconnected from Foreigns incentive
to subsidize while it is not the unique driver of Homes incentives to tax: both countries
incentives are shaped, instead, by the sign of productivity gaps.
Our results shed further light on the conclusions of the existing literature. With
respect to the few previous studies of asymmetric trade with endogenous growth and
exhaustible resources (Daubanes and Grimaud, 2010; Peretto and Valente, 2011), the
distinctive feature of our analysis is that we assume asymmetric technologies to ob-
tain links between persistent gaps in productivity growth and the observed tendency
of resource-exporting (importing) countries to subsidize (tax) domestic resource use.4 In
3This is an intermediate result of our analysis. For given taxes, the ratio between the two countries
demand for resources reects the ratio between the two countries nal output and the latter ratio is
higher the higher is the ratio between the two countriesinvestment rates determined by the respective
R&D productivities: see equation (25) below.
4Daubanes and Grimaud (2010) assume identical productivities via immediate technology di¤usion and
introduce pollution externalities to analyze a cooperative tax game to correct for environmental damage.
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particular, our results go beyond the rent-extraction mechanism by showing that asym-
metric spillovers from past research provide (i) an otherwise absent rationale for the rise
of subsidies in resource-rich countries and (ii) an additional incentive to tax resource
inows in resource-poor countries.
2 The Model
The model comprises two countries, called Home and Foreign and indexed by i = h; f ,
and follows the structure developed in Bretschger and Valente (2012).5 Each economy
produces a tradable nal good, consumed by the residents of both countries, using man-
made intermediate inputs and an exhaustible natural resource. Trade is asymmetric since
the natural resource stock is exclusively owned by Foreign residents: Home only exports
its nal good whereas Foreign exports both nal goods and resource units. Output growth
is driven by R&D activity that expands the varieties of intermediate inputs (Rivera-Batiz
and Romer, 1991). Two market failures a¤ect the domestic equilibrium of each economy:
the existence of monopoly rents in intermediatesproduction, and knowledge spillovers
enhancing the productivity of R&D rms over time.
In this paper, we will treat the symmetric laissez-faire equilibrium as the relevant
initial state of a¤airs and study the welfare consequences of introducing resource taxes
set by selsh national governments. Throughout the discussion, however, we also consider
e¢ cient equilibria to clarify the role played by market failures in our results. This section
thus presents a general specication of the model in which national governments have
access to three scal instruments that could possibly correct for domestic market failures,
i.e., taxes on domestic resource use, subsidies to R&D, and taxes on nal producers.
Using conventional notation, the time-derivative and the growth rate of variable g (t)
are respectively denoted by _g (t) dg (t) =dt and g^ (t)  _g (t) =g (t). Detailed derivations
Peretto and Valente (2011) assume identical R&D technologies and study the impact of resource booms
on innovation rates and relative welfare.
5Closed-economy variants of endogenous growth models with natural inputs include Aznar-Marquez
and Ruiz-Tamarit (2005), Valente (2011) and Peretto (2012).
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and proofs of the Propositions are collected in the Appendix.
2.1 Final Producers, Intermediate Sectors and R&D
Final Sector. Each countrys nal sector produces Yi units of a tradable consumption
good using Mi varieties of di¤erentiated intermediate products, Li units of labor, and Ri
units of an exhaustible resource, according to
Yi =
Z Mi
0
(Xi (mi))
 dmi  (viLi) Ri ; i = h; f; (1)
where Xi (mi) is the quantity of the mi-th variety of intermediate input, vi is labor
productivity, and parameters satisfy ++  = 1 with 0 < ; ;  < 1. The endogenous
engine of growth is represented by increases in the mass Mi of intermediatesvarieties,
while labor e¢ ciency grows at the exogenous rate v^i = i. Labor is inelastically supplied:
Lh and Lf are xed amounts coinciding with the respective population sizes. The law
of one price holds for all traded goods: the quantities (Yh; Yf ) are sold at the respective
world prices (P hY ; P
f
Y ) and the exhaustible resource is sold to all nal producers at the
same world price PR. The wage rate and the price of each intermediate, respectively
denoted by P iL and P
i
X(mi)
, are country-specic. Production costs in the nal sector are
a¤ected by proportional taxes on the purchases of intermediate inputs and on resource
use, respectively denoted by bi and i. The resulting prot-maximizing conditions read6
PRRi (1 + i) = P
i
Y Yi; (2)
P iX(mi) (1 + bi) = P
i
Y (Xi (mi))
 1 (viLi) R

i ; (3)
where (3) is valid for each variety mi 2 [0;Mi].
Intermediate Sector. Each variety of intermediate is produced by a monopolist who
holds the relevant patent and maximizes prots i (mi) taking the demand schedule
(3) as given. Producing one unit of intermediate requires & units of nal good, where
6Both bi and i are constant over time. The assumption is innocuous since decentralizing e¢ cient
allocations requires implementing constant tax rates, as shown in section 3.
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& > 0 represents a constant marginal cost that equally applies to each variety. Prot
maximization implies the mark-up rule
P iX(mi) = (&=)P
i
Y for each mi 2 [0;Mi] ; (4)
and therefore symmetric quantities and prots across monopolists.
R&D Sector. The mass of intermediatesvarieties Mi grows over time by virtue of
R&D activity pursued by competitive rms that develop new blueprints and sell the
relevant patents to new monopolists. We represent R&D rms as a consolidated sector
earning zero prots due to free-entry. Developing blueprints requires investing units of
the domestic nal good, with marginal productivity i. R&D investment is subsidized
by the domestic government at rate ai > 0. Denoting by Zi the total amount invested
by R&D rms, aggregate R&D investment in country i is Zi (1 + ai), and the increase in
the mass of varieties equals
_Mi (t) = i (t)  (1 + ai)  Zi (t) : (5)
The productivity of the R&D sector is a¤ected by knowledge spillovers whereby the
current productivity of investment, i, increases with the state of the art, conveniently
measured by the ratio Mi=Yi. The spillover function is
i (t)  'i  (Mi (t) =Yi (t)) (6)
where 'i > 0 is a constant parameter. From from (5) and (6), the growth rate of
intermediatesvarieties is proportional to the economy-wide rate of R&D investment,
M^i (t) = 'i (1 + ai)  (Zi (t) =Yi (t)) ; (7)
a relationship that is empirically plausible (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004: p.300-302)
and implies the elimination of scale e¤ects.
2.2 Resource Extraction in Foreign
The owners of extracting rms are households in Foreign, each of whom earns the same
fraction 1=Lf of rents. Extracting rms are competitive and costlessly extract the resource
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ow R (t) from a non-renewable stock of resource Q (t), taking the world resource price PR
as given. Extraction equals the sum of the resource units employed in the two countries,
R (t) = Rh (t) +Rf (t), and rms maximize present-value protsZ 1
0
PR (t)R (t) e
  R1t rf (v)dvdt; (8)
subject to the dynamic resource constraint _Q (t) =  R (t). The solution to this dynamic
problem is characterized by the conditions
P^R (t) = rf (t) ; (9)
Q0 =
Z 1
0
R (t) dt: (10)
Equation (9) is Hotellings rule: the resource price must grow at a rate equal to the rate
of return to investment. Equation (10) is the intertemporal resource constraint requiring
asymptotic exhaustion of the resource stock.
2.3 Governments, Households and Trade Balance
Governments. In country i = h; f , public R&D subsidies are nanced by taxes on
intermediates purchases and on resource use. The public budget is balanced via per
capita lump-sum transfers Fi:
aiP
i
Y Zi = FiLi + biMiP
i
XXi + iPRRi: (11)
Households. Economy i is populated by Li homogeneous households that solve a two-step
consumer problem. First, agents decide how to allocate expenditures between imported
and domestically-produced nal goods. Denoting by cji the quantity of the good produced
in country j and individually consumed in country i, the instantaneous utility of each
resident in country i reads
ui(c
h
i ; c
f
i ) = ln
h
(chi )
(cfi )
1 
i
; 0 <  < 1; (12)
where the weighting parameters,  and 1  , indicate the preference taste for Home and
Foreign goods, respectively. Maximizing (12) subject to the expenditure constraint
Eci =Li = P
h
Y c
h
i + P
f
Y c
f
i ; (13)
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where Eci is aggregate consumption expenditure in country i, we obtain the indirect utility
function ui = ln[!  (Eci =Li)], where !  !(P hY ; P fY ) is a weighted average of nal goods
prices (see Appendix). In the second step, agents choose the time prole of expenditures
by maximizing present-value utility
Ui 
Z 1
0
e t  ln[(! (t)  (Eci (t) =Li)]dt; (14)
where  > 0 is the pure time-preference rate, and the path of ! (t) is taken as given by the
household. Maximizing (14) subject to the household wealth constraint (see Appendix)
yields the Keynes-Ramsey rule
E^ci (t) = ri (t)  : (15)
Trade. Assuming balanced trade, the value of Foreign total exports  resources plus
exported consumption goods must equal the value of nal goods imported from Home,
PRRh + P
f
Y Lhc
f
h = P
h
Y Lfc
h
f : (16)
The resource-rich economy exhibits a structural decit in nal-goods trade, and this asym-
metric structure is the source of the rent-extraction mechanisms typically encountered in
the related literature. Considering the aggregate constraints, we simplify the notation by
denoting aggregate R&D expenditures of country i as Edi  P iY Zi (1 + ai) and aggregate
expenditures in intermediates production as Exi  P iY &MiXi. Consequently, the two
economies satisfy
Eh  Ech + Edh + Exh = P hY Yh   PRRh; (17)
Ef  Ecf + Edf + Exf = P fY Yf + PRRh; (18)
where Ei  Eci +Edi +Exi may be interpreted as an index of gross aggregate expenditures
in country i.7 Equation (17), in particular, shows that total expenditures in Home equal
7 If we subtract intermediate expenditures to the gross expenditure index, we obtain the national
accounting denition of gross domestic income GDIi = Ei Exi . In the present discussion of the theoretical
model, we only consider the comprehensive measure of expenditure Ei because it considerably simplies
the calculations as well as the exposition. The accounting denition the national accounting denition of
gross domestic income GDIi obviously yields identical results (see Bretschger and Valente, 2012).
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the value of nal output less the value of resource rents paid to Foreign resource owners.
2.4 World Equilibrium
The world equilibrium exhibits three fundamental properties: (i) interest rate parity, (ii)
balanced growth with stable expenditure shares, and (iii) a constant equilibrium level of
relative resource use. In the present context, result (iii) deserves special emphasis because
the analysis of strategic taxation is entirely based on the relationship between national
welfare and relative resource use.
Interest rate parity. In each country i, the rate of return to investment in terms of
domestic nal output is given by the growth rate of physical productivity in the domestic
nal sector, denoted by 
i and equal to a weighted sum of the growth rates of the mass
of varieties, of labor e¢ ciency and of resource use (see Appendix):
ri   P^ iY = 
i 
 (1  ) (1 + ai)
1 + bi
'i +

1  i +

1  R^i; (19)
The country-specic terms in the right hand side of (19) imply that Home and Foreign
may exhibit persistent gaps in productivity growth as a result of di¤erences in structural
parameters ('i; i) or in policy variables (ai; bi). Equilibrium in trade and symmetric
preferences imply that physical productivity di¤erentials are compensated by terms-of-
trade dynamics (see Appendix):
P^ hY   P^ fY = 
f   
h: (20)
Result (20) is linked to our assumption of a unit elasticity of substitution between traded
goods8 and implies that the world equilibrium is characterized by interest rate parity:
results (19) and (20) yield rh = rf .
Balanced growth. Interest rate parity implies that consumption expenditures grow at
the same rate in the two countries: by the Keynes-Ramsey rule (15), we have E^h = E^f =
8Relative income shares with endogenous growth are discussed in Grossman and Helpman (1990),
Feenstra (1996) and Valente (2009).
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ri    with rh = rf . Therefore, the growth rates of physical nal output, resource use,
and mass of varieties, equal (see Appendix)
Y^h = 
h    and Y^f = 
f   ; (21)
R^h = R^f =  ; (22)
M^i = 'i (1  ) (1 + ai) (1 + bi) 1   ; (23)
at each point in time. We stress two relevant implications of this balanced-growth equilib-
rium. First, since (P hY Yh)=(P
f
Y Yf ) is constant, the two countries exhibit constant shares
in the world market for nal goods and thereby stable shares of world income. Second,
constant growth rates at each point in time allow us to obtain closed form solutions for
both consumption paths and for present-value welfare levels.
Relative nal output and relative resource use. Our analysis of taxation will hinge on
two equilibrium relationships that link the two countriespropensities to invest and their
respective shares in nal output and in world resource use. First, we dene a convenient
index of gross investment rate Ii as the sum of the shares of domestic output invested in
R&D and used in intermediatesproduction. In equilibrium, such investment rate equals
(see Appendix)
Ii  E
d
i
P iY Yi
+
Exi
P iY Yi
=
'i (1  ) (1 + ai)   (1 + bi)
'i (1 + bi)| {z }
R&D investment rate
+
2
1 + bi| {z }
Intermediates
(24)
for each country i = h; f . Considering market shares in nal output, we combine the
expenditure constraints (17)-(18) with (24) to obtain (see Appendix)
P hY Yh
P fY Yf
=

1   
1  If
1  Ih : (25)
Expression (25) shows that the value of Homes nal output (relative to Foreign) increases
with the taste parameter of world consumers for Homes nal goods (relative to Foreign)
and is positively related to Homes investment rate (relative to Foreign). Now consider
Homes relative resource use, dened as  (t)  Rh (t) =Rf (t). Result (22) implies that,
in equilibrium, relative resource use is constant over time. Importantly, this equilibrium
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level  (t) =  is directly a¤ected by both countriesinvestment rates through (25) because
the countriesrelative demands for resources depend on the two countriesrelative output
levels: combining (25) with the nal sectorsresource demand schedules (2), we obtain
 =
1 + f
1 + h
 
1   
1  If
1  Ih : (26)
The world resource allocation is thus determined by three components: the relative dis-
tortion induced by domestic taxes, the relative consumerstaste for the countriesnal
goods, and the relative investment rates. This result is crucial for understanding the
governmentsincentives to enact strategic resource taxes. Infact, we will show that each
government is tempted to use the domestic resource tax so as to induce a specic level of
 that is associated to maximal domestic welfare.
3 Laissez-Faire and E¢ cient Allocations
This section describes the characteristics of two benchmark allocations: the symmetric
laissez-faire equilibrium, in which all taxes and subsidies are set to zero, and the e¢ cient
resource allocation arising when total resource supply is e¢ ciently split between the two
countries. In order to dene the latter, we exploit the concept of symmetric condition-
ally e¢ cient equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium arising when both governments neutralize
domestic market failures through appropriate scal instruments.
We stress that, from the logical point of view, the initial state of a¤airs that is
relevant to our analysis is the laissez-faire equilibrium: our aim is to understand what
would be the welfare e¤ect of imposing a resource tax or a resource subsidy in each
country starting from an initial situation without public intervention. In contrast, we
treat the concept of e¢ cient allocation as an expositional device. The rst reason behind
this strategy is practical. Since the laissez-faire equilibrium is inherently ine¢ cient, it is
di¢ cult to judge prima facie whether a governments incentive to deviate from laissez-
faire reects the existence of pure gains from international redistribution or the existence
of unexploited gains induced by market failures. In this respect, the e¢ cient allocation
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can be treated as an alternative benchmark state of a¤airs which allows us to determine
the existence of pure gains from redistribution in isolation from the other mechanisms
operating under laissez-faire.9
The second reason why the e¢ cient allocation is not our preferred initial state of af-
fairsis logical. In section 3.2, we show that the e¢ cient resource allocation can be viewed
as an equilibrium that would be achieved if each government were to maximize domestic
welfare at given international prices. In our welfare analysis of resource taxes (section
4), we postulate that the incentive for a government to deviate from an initial state of
a¤airs is the governments expectation to earn domestic welfare gains, and the calculation
of these gains includes terms-of-trade e¤ects. Our hypothesis that governments are able
to infer the impact of national taxes on international prices thus appears at odds with
the view that the initial state of a¤airs is a symmetric e¢ cient equilibrium.10 For this
reason, we consider the laissez-faire equilibrium as the relevant initial state of a¤airs in
our welfare analysis.
3.1 Laissez-Faire Resource Allocation
Suppose that taxes and subsidies are set to zero in each country: i = bi = ai = 0. The
laissez-faire equilibrium is ine¢ cient by construction since monopolistic competition and
knowledge spillovers imply a misallocation of domestic output between consumption and
investment within each country. The crucial aspect, however, concerns the implications
for aggregate e¢ ciency in resource use, that is, how laissez-faire changes the way in
9This point will become clearer in section 4, which shows that, starting from an e¢ cient resource
allocation, the Home government can raise national welfare to the detriment of Foreign residents by
raising a positive tax on domestic resource. This is the traditional rent extraction incentive which results
from the asymmetric structure of international trade: it operates even under e¢ ciency conditions and is
therefore a pure redistribution e¤ect.
10Alternatively, if we interpret e¢ cient allocations as the equilibrium outcome of a cooperative game in
which world welfare is maximized, the hypothesis that the initial state of a¤airs is an e¢ cient equilibrium
appears inconsistent with our hypothesis that governments are selsh (i.e., they only care about national
welfare maximization).
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which the world resource supply is distributed between the two countries. From (24) and
(26), relative resource use under laissez-faire equals
LF  
1   
1  + (='f )
1  + (='h) : (27)
Equation (27) shows that, under laissez-faire, the world resource allocation is a¤ected by
cross-country di¤erences in R&D productivity because spillovers from past research dis-
tort Home and Foreign investment rates and thereby the two countriesrelative resource
demand. The important information contained in expression (27) is that the extent by
which the worlds allocation of resources is ine¢ cient is determined by the size of the gap
between the two countriesparameters of R&D productivity, 'h and 'f . Faster produc-
tivity growth in a given country pushes up the countrys share of resource use because
as shown in (25) above  faster productivity growth drives up the countrys share in
world nal output.
3.2 E¢ cient Resource Allocation
In this subsection, we determine the e¢ cient allocation of total resource supply between
the two countries. To this aim, we exploit the concept of conditionally e¢ cient symmetric
equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium that would arise if both national governments were to
neutralize the respective domestic market failures through appropriate scal instruments.
Suppose that government i eliminates the domestic ine¢ ciencies generated by monopoly
pricing and R&D spillovers. The resulting allocation in country i is called conditionally
e¢ cientaccording to the following
Denition 1 (Domestic conditional e¢ ciency) An allocation is conditionally e¢ cient
for country i if domestic output is allocated so as to maximize present-value utility Ui
subject to the technology, income, and resource constraints faced by country i at given
international prices.
The conditionally e¢ cient allocation (CE-allocation, hereafter) is similar to the welfare-
maximizing allocation that characterizes social optimality in closed-economy models.
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However, in the present context, conditional e¢ ciency and optimality are quite di¤er-
ent concepts. In closed economies, the welfare-maximizing allocation is chosen by a
social planner endowed with full control over all the elements of the allocation. The CE-
allocation in country i, instead, postulates maximal domestic utility within country i at
given international prices. Since international prices are inuenced by the scal policies of
both countries, there is no general presumption that governments actually wish to imple-
ment the CE-allocations in practice. If governments can infer all the general-equilibrium
e¤ects generated by scal policy, international prices are not taken as given and a selsh
government may nd it desirable to deviate from domestic conditional e¢ ciency as long as
such deviation increases domestic welfare to the detriment of the other countrys welfare
(this is indeed the case for the Home country, as shown in the next section). In line with
this reasoning, we do not interpret the CE-allocation as a national target. Instead, we
use the symmetric CE-equilibrium as an analytical device allowing us to determine the
e¢ cient resource allocation at the world level, i.e., how would the total resource supply
be split between the two countries if all ine¢ ciencies were internalized.
We characterize CE-allocations by denoting the relevant variables by tildas. In Home,
the CE-allocation is represented by the paths of imported resource ows and expenditures
(in consumption, intermediatesproduction and R&D activity), that maximize Homes
indirect utility subject to the nal-good technology, the intermediate-good technology,
the R&D technology, and Homes expenditure constraint:
n
~Rh; ~E
c
h;
~Exh ;
~Edh
o1
t=0
= argmaxUh s.t. (1); (7); (17)
where Uh in (14) is maximized taking international prices as given, and the R&D exter-
nality is fully taken into account through constraint (7). In Foreign, the CE-allocation
is represented by the paths of domestic resource use, exported resources, and expendi-
tures that maximize Foreign utility subject to the technology constraints, the aggregate
expenditure constraint, and the exhaustible resource constraint:
n
~Rh; ~Rf ; ~E
c
f ;
~Exf ;
~Edf
o1
t=0
= argmaxUf s.t. (1); (7); (17) and _Q =  Rh  Rf .
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Solving these maximization problems yields the following result (proof in Appendix). If
both economies display conditional e¢ ciency, the resulting level of relative resource use
is
~ =

1   : (28)
Expression (28) shows that the e¢ cient relative resource use is exclusively determined
by preference parameters, with no role played by technology. The intuition is that, in a
symmetric CE-equilibrium, technological spillovers are internalized by means of e¢ cient
R&D subsidies and do not distort the countriesrelative demand for resources.11 Indeed,
the notion of e¢ ciency embodied in (28) applies to resource allocation at the world level:
the relative demands for resources from the two countriesnal sectors only reect the
relative tastes of world consumers for the two countriesnal goods.
Armed with these results, we can determine a more general concept, the e¢ cient level
of relative resource use, as follows:
Denition 2 (E¢ cient resource allocation) At the world level, total resource supply is
e¢ ciently allocated between the two countries when
 = E  
1   (29)
The notion of e¢ cient resource allocation (29) is more general than that contained
in (28) because relative resource use may be e¢ cient at the world level independently
of whether the two countries have internalized their respective market failures, i.e., re-
gardless of whether the world general equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient in every respect. For
example, relative resource use may be e¢ cient even in the laissez-faire equilibrium: if
there are no productivity gaps, we have 'h = 'f and equation (27) implies that LF
coincides with the e¢ cient level E .
11The optimal R&D subsidies and taxes that allow national governments to decentralize the CE-
allocation are constant over time because the optimal propensities obtained from the respective domestic
social problems preserve balanced growth at the world level (see Appendix).
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3.3 Preliminary Comparison
Comparing the e¢ cient relative resource use E with the laissez-faire level LF , expres-
sions (27) and (29) immediately show that under laissez-faire, a countrys relative resource
use is ine¢ ciently high (from the point of view of the worlds resource allocation) when
its R&D productivity is higher than in the other country:
'h ? 'f implies LF ? E : (30)
The reason behind result (30) follows directly from (27): under laissez faire, technological
R&D spillovers are not internalized and the country exhibiting stronger R&D spillovers
displays faster productivity growth, a higher share in world nal output and thereby a
higher relative resource use. More importantly, result (30) implies di¤erent incentives for
national governments to deviate from either regime, as we show below.
4 Taxation and Welfare
This section provides a comprehensive study of the welfare e¤ects of resource taxes. As
a rst step, we show analytically that national welfare is a hump-shaped function of
the domestic resource tax in each country. These welfare curves imply that government
i might use the domestic tax i to move the world equilibrium towards the allocation
that maximizes domestic welfare. This reasoning hinges on the idea that the existence
of potential welfare gains for a given country represents an incentive for that countrys
government to deviate unilaterally from the initial state of a¤airs. Clearly, for this logic
to be coherent, we need to assume that national governments recognize the existence of
potential domestic welfare gains, which in turn requires that governments do not take
international prices as given: since the welfare curvesincorporate all the general equi-
librium e¤ects of resource taxes, a government aiming at the curves peak is implicitly
calculating the terms-of-trade e¤ects induced by changes in the resource tax.
Building on this notion of national incentives, we show that the two countries wish to
deviate from laissez-faire for quite di¤erent reasons. The resource-exporting country seeks
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an e¢ cient world resource allocation, i.e., Foreign government has an incentive to use re-
source taxes in order to recollect the unexploited gains generated by R&D spillovers. The
resource-importing country, instead, seeks an ine¢ cient resource allocation, i.e., Homes
government has a double incentive to use resource taxes: recollecting unexploited gains
(induced by R&D spillovers) as well as earning pure gains from redistribution (determined
by the rent-extraction mechanism). These conclusions, and the specic scenario arising
when the Home economy displays stronger R&D spillovers than the Foreign economy, are
formally derived below.
4.1 The Rent-Extraction Mechanism
A basic property of the present model is that Homes resource tax a¤ects the world income
distribution whereas the Foreign resource tax does not change income shares. In every
equilibrium, Homes share of world total expenditures equals
Eh
Eh + Ef
=
(P hY Yh)=(P
f
Y Yf )
1 + (P hY Yh)=(P
f
Y Yf )| {z }
Final output share
 (1  ~h)| {z }
Net of rents to Foreign
; (31)
where ~h   (1 + h) 1 is the tax-adjusted resource elasticity in nal production in
Home. Expression (31) shows that Homes expenditure share is the product of two factors.
The rst is Homes share in world nal output, which is independent of resource taxes
by result (25).12 The second factor represents the e¤ect of Homes resource dependence:
from (2), domestic producers must use a fraction ~h of revenues from nal-good sales to
purchase imported resources. By denition, ~h   (1 + h) 1 is a¤ected by the Home
resource tax whereas it is independent of Foreign resource tax. Therefore, an increase in h
increases Homes share of world expenditures through a decline in ~h whereas variations in
f leave expenditure shares una¤ected. This result hinges on the asymmetric structure of
12The intuition is that variations in h or f induce o¤setting variations in physical output quantities
and in physical output prices such that the ratio between the values of the two countries output is
unchanged (Bretschger and Valente, 2012). These opposite price-quantity movements appear explicitly
in expressions (36)-(37) below.
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trade and is a variant of Bergstroms (1982) rent-extraction mechanism whereby resource
taxes in the importing country capture part of the rents that would otherwise accrue
to foreign residents. It follows that Homes government may be tempted to increase its
share of world income by artically reducing its resource demand via a higher domestic
resource tax. We show below that this is a concrete temptation: Homes domestic welfare
is indeed higher when Homes relative resource use is ine¢ ciently low.
4.2 Welfare Curves
Importantly, the balanced-growth property of the world equilibrium implies that con-
sumption paths and utility levels can be solved in closed form (see Appendix for detailed
derivations). In the two countries, present-value welfare equals
Uh = {h +
1

ln

p1 0  Yh (0)  ch

; (32)
Uf = {f +
1

ln

p 0  Yf (0)  cf

; (33)
where {i is a constant factor independent of resource taxes, p0  P hY (0) =P fY (0) is the
initial relative price of the Home nal good, and ci  Eci =(P hY Yi) is the equilibrium
share of consumption over domestic output in country i. Specically, the consumption
propensities equal
ch = 1  Ih  

1 + h
; (34)
cf = 1  If +

1 + h
 
1   
1  If
1  Ih ; (35)
respectively. These results allow us to calculate the marginal e¤ect of an increase in the
domestic resource tax on domestic welfare, dUi=di, for each country. In general, the
terms in square brackets in (32)-(33) imply that variations in i entail three e¤ects: (i) on
terms of trade, (ii) on domestic physical output, and (iii) on consumption propensity.13
The direction of the rst two e¤ects is intuitive: an increase in the Home (Foreign)
resource tax increases the relative price of the Home (Foreign) good and reduces Home
13See the Appendix for detailed proofs of the statements reported in this section.
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(Foreign) physical output. Instead, the direction of the consumption-propensity e¤ect 
i.e. the sign of dln ci =di is asymmetric as it is evident from (34)-(35). In Home, the
resource tax increases the ratio between consumption and nal output:
  dUh
dh
= (1  ) d ln p0
dh| {z }
Terms of Trade (+)
+
d lnYh (0)
dh| {z }
Physical Output (-)
+
d ln ch
dh| {z }
Consumption Share (+)
: (36)
In Foreign, instead, an increase in the domestic resource tax leaves the consumption-
output ratio unchanged: since dln cf=df = 0, the marginal welfare e¤ect of the Foreign
tax only depends on the relative strength of the variations in terms of trade and physical
output,
  dUf
df
= 
d ln p 10
df
(+)
+
d lnYf (0)
df
(-)
: (37)
The asymmetric e¤ects of Home and Foreign taxes on the respective consumption propen-
sities are directly linked to the rent-extraction mechanism described in the previous sub-
section: in Home, the resource tax increases domestic disposable income and thereby
the value of consumption expenditures relative to domestic nal output. In Foreign, in-
stead, variations in f do not a¤ect the world income distribution and thereby Foreign
propensity to consume.
The contrasting e¤ects of resource taxes on output prices and physical quantities
imply that, in each country, the welfare-tax relationship Ui (i) is hump-shaped: there
exists a unique level of the domestic resource tax, maxi , that maximizes domestic welfare
Ui (i) for a given state of a¤airs in the other country. Importantly, the model structure
implies that, for each country i, the welfare-maximizing domestic tax rate maxi is always
associated to a specic level of relative resource use, which we denote by maxi . The fol-
lowing Proposition establishes that the welfare-maximizing taxes of the two countries are
necessarily associated with di¤erent equilibria: the two governments cannot simultane-
ously implement the respective maxi because Home would prefer a lower level of relative
resource use.
23
Proposition 3 In Foreign, implementing the welfare-maximizing resource tax maxf al-
ways implies an e¢ cient resource allocation
 = maxf =

1   : (38)
In Home, implementing the welfare-maximizing resource tax maxh always implies ine¢ -
ciently low relative resource use
 = maxh <

1   : (39)
Proposition 3 shows that resource taxes serve di¤erent purposes in the two countries.
Result (38) establishes that Foreign welfare is maximal when relative resource use coin-
cides with the e¢ cient level. The reason is that Foreign rms act as price takers and thus
earn maximal rents when total supply is split between the two countries in e¢ cient pro-
portionsfrom an aggregate perspective. The consequence is that the Foreign goverment
may use f to induce an e¢ cient level of relative resource use. Homes government, in-
stead, always has an incentive to deviate from e¢ ciency in the worlds resource allocation:
from (39), domestic welfare is higher if Home pushes its relative resource use below the
e¢ cient level because a lower demand for primary imports raises Homes income share via
the rent extraction mechanism. Consequently, Home may use h to distort the allocation
in order to raise its disposable income and welfare to the detriment of Foreign residents.
More generally, Proposition 3 implies that if both national governments fully recognize all
the general-equilibrium e¤ects of the respective resource taxes, the independent pursuit
of maximal domestic welfare would determine conicting objectives: each government
would seek a di¤erent equilibrium level of relative resource use. This is a very general
conclusion because neither (38) nor (39) assume that the two economies are starting from
a specic equilibrium.
4.3 Selsh Incentives to Deviate
Proposition 3 may in principle be applied to any initial state of a¤airs. As noted before,
our reference benchmark is the symmetric laissez-faire equilibrium. However, it is in-
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structive to begin our discussion with a hypothetical initial state of a¤airs characterized
by e¢ ciency in resource allocation: this exposition will simplify the interpretation of the
results holding under laissez-faire.
Proposition 4 Given an equilibrium characterized by the e¢ cient level of relative re-
source use,  = E, we have dUh=dh > 0 and dUf=df = 0.
Since a resource tax in a given country reduces that countrys share of world resource
use, Proposition 4 directly follows from Proposition 3. Homes government has an incen-
tive to tax resource inows in order to reduce  below the e¢ cient level and to obtain
pure redistribution gains via rent extraction. The government of Foreign, instead, has no
incentive to deviate since, by (38), the welfare-maximizing resource tax is associated to
an equilibrium in which the world resource allocation is e¢ cient. It follows that, starting
from an e¢ cient allocation of world resource supply, the potential source of deviations is
exclusively the rent-extraction mechanism for the Home country.
Now consider symmetric laissez-faire as the initial state of a¤airs: all taxes and subsi-
dies are set to zero. Starting from this equilibrium, the scheme of incentives falls in three
possible cases depending on the sign of productivity gaps:
Proposition 5 Given a laissez-faire equilibrium, higher R&D productivity in Home cre-
ates an incentive for Foreign to subsidize domestic resource use and exacerbates Homes
incentive to tax domestic resource use. The general scheme is:
i. If 'h > 'f then dUh=dh > 0 and dUf=df < 0;
ii. If 'h = 'f then dUh=dh > 0 and dUf=df = 0;
iii. If 'h < 'f then dUh=dh R 0 and dUf=df > 0;
Focusing on result (i), the intuition follows from expression (30). Higher R&D pro-
ductivity in Home implies that Homes relative resource use strictly exceeds the e¢ cient
level. In this situation, both countries have incentives to deviate. On the one hand, For-
eign would gain from subsidizing domestic resource use since this would contrast Homes
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over-consumption of the resource and move the world resource allocation towards the
e¢ ciency condition  = E , which maximizes Foreign welfare by expression (38). On
the other hand, Home would gain from taxing domestic resource use even more inten-
sively than starting from e¢ ciency conditions: the positive productivity gap implies that
Homes resource use is strictly above the e¢ cient level whereas maximal welfare in Home
would require  to be strictly below the e¢ cient level by expression (39). Therefore,
persistent gaps in productivity growth originating in R&D externalities matter for both
countries: they create an incentive to implement subsidies in Foreign, and they exacer-
bate the incentive to raise taxes in Home. Since the hypothesis 'h > 'f is empirically
plausible, this conclusion suggests a novel potential explanation for the stylized facts that
characterize world oil trade: the observed subsidies (taxes) on domestic oil consumption
in oil-rich (oil-poor) economies may be induced by the fact that oil-poor countries exhibit
faster growth in R&D productivity with stronger spillovers from past research.14 Below,
we investigate whether this explanation is supported by game-theoretic arguments.
5 Strategic Taxation
In this section, we extend the previous analysis to include strategic interaction between
the two countriesgovernments.15 Our main objective is to understand whether the co-
existence of resource subsidies in Foreign and resource taxes in Home can be an equilib-
rium outcome when both governments choose the respective resource taxes in a strategic
manner. As a rst step, we consider one-shot games where each government sets the
14The other cases (ii)-(iii) reported in Proposition 5 are easily interpreted. If R&D technologies are
identical in the two countries, relative resource use coincides with the e¢ cient level so that Proposition 4
applies. Finally, if R&D productivity is higher in Foreign, relative resource use falls short of the e¢ cient
level: Foreign would gain from raising a resource tax whereas Home would gain by implementing either
a resource tax or a subsidy, depending on the width of the productivity gap.
15The welfare-tax relationships studied in section 4 neglect strategic interactions between the two
countries in the sense that implementing maxi in country i maximizes domestic welfare Ui all else equal,
that is, only if the other countrys tax rate is unchanged.
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domestic tax once and forever. After showing that no Nash equilibrium exists with si-
multaneous moves (subsect. 5.1), we consider two-stage games and show that the only
equilibrium that may exist with nite tax rates is a Stackelberg equilibrium in which
Foreign government moves rst (subsect. 5.2). We then show that the unique Stack-
elberg equilibrium is characterized by resource subsidies in Foreign and resource taxes
in Home for a wide range of parameter values (subsect. 5.3). Several interpretations of
the Stackelberg equilibrium in terms of commitment devices are discussed in subsection
5.4. Throughout this section, we simplify the analysis by setting all non-resource taxes
to zero.
5.1 Nash Equilibria
This section investigates the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We take as
a benchmark a one-shot game with simultaneous moves where each government i uses
the domestic resource tax rate i as an instrument to maximize own welfare Ui given the
other countrys chosen tax rate j (where index j denotes the country 6= i). The chosen
tax rates are then implemented from the reference time zeroonward. The best response
function of government i is Bi = Bi (j), which essentially represents the domestic welfare-
maximizing tax rate maxi dened in the previous section as a function Bi () of the other
countrys tax j . Given the two governments best response functions, Bh = Bh (f )
and Bf = Bf (h), a Nash equilibrium is a couple of values (
e
h; 
e
f ) for which a xed
point exists, that is, Bh( ef ) = 
e
h and Bf (
e
h) = 
e
f . In seeking such equilibria, the
only restrictions that we impose are that (i) both countriestax rates take nite values
and (ii) that such values are compatible with the existence of a market equilibrium with
positive consumption. In the latter respect, we note that expression (34) determines a
lower bound on Homes tax rate: a positive propensity ch > 0 requires us to impose the
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feasibility restriction16
1 + h >

1  Ih : (40)
As shown in the Appendix, the two best response functions have the following character-
istics. In Foreign, Bf = Bf (h) is linear and the domestic tax rate 
B
f is given by
Bf =
1  Ih
1  If  (1 + h)  1| {z }
Bf (h)
; (41)
which infact implies an e¢ cient relative resource use,  = = (1  ). In Home, instead,
the best response function Bh = Bh (f ) is non-linear and can be conveniently expressed
by means of the inverse function, f = B
 1
h (
B
h ), which reads
f =

1  
1  + (Bh )
   (
B
h )


 1  Ih
1  If 
 
1 + Bh
  1| {z }
B 1h (
B
h )
; (42)
where we have dened
(Bh ) 
1  
(1 + Bh ) (1  Ih)  
> 0:
The strictly positive sign of (Bh ) follows from the feasibility restriction (40), and implies
that the term in curly brackets in (42) is strictly below unity for any feasible nite value
of Bh . Therefore, by comparing the right hand sides of (41) and (42), we obtain that the
strict inequality
Bf (
o
h) > B
 1
h (
o
h)
holds for any feasible nite tax rate  oh . This means that no Nash equilibrium exists,
in that such an equilibrium would require Bf ( eh) = B
 1
h (
e
h) for a feasible nite value
 eh. This result is graphically described in graph (a) of Figure 1, showing the lack of
intersections between the two response functions. In the same Figure, graph (b) provides
16The economic intuition for this lower bound is that a positive consumption share requires, amongst
other conditions, that Home does not spend too much on imported resource inputs. In this respect,
raising h helps reducing Homes demand for resource imports, from which it follows that h must not be
too low.
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further intuition by interpreting this result as an everlasting tax war : a hypothetical tax
rate  0h in Home would prompt Foreign to implement the tax rate 
0
f , to which Home would
respond with a higher tax rate  00h > 
0
h, which in turn would call for a higher Foreign tax
rate, and so on. As long as governments move simultaneously, their incentives remain
mutually inconsistent for any combination of nite tax rates because Homes government
always has an incentive to push relative resource use below the e¢ cient level desired by
Foreign. This observation naturally leads us to consider alternative one-shot games in
which governments do not move simultaneously, a point which we address below.
5.2 Stackelberg Equilibria
Suppose that the government of one country sets the domestic resource tax before the
other countrys government sets its own resource tax, and that the chosen tax rates are
then implemented from the reference time zero onwards. This is still a one-shot game 
i.e., each government sets the domestic tax once and forever but choices are now made
in two distinct stages, which makes the strategic interaction richer. The second mover,
denoted by j, observes the tax rate chosen by the rst mover i, and optimally chooses
the domestic tax j = S2j according to the same best-response function that we have
used to study Nash equilibria, namely S2j = Bj (i). Under complete information, the
rst mover expects the opponents reaction and chooses the domestic tax i = S1i that
maximizes domestic welfare taking into account the best response function of the other
government,
S1i = argmaxfig
Ui(i; 
S2
j ) = argmaxfig
Ui (i; Bj (i)) : (43)
A Stackelberg equilibrium is a couple of feasible nite values (S1i ; 
S2
j ) that jointly satisfy
the two playersoptimality conditions that is, S2j = Bj
 
S1i

and
dUi (i; Bj (i))
di

i=S1i
= 0: (44)
Below, we study the existence of Stackelberg equilibria in the two possible scenarios,
namely the one in which Home is the leader and the other in which Home is the fol-
lower. To derive neat results, we re-write the welfare levels (32)-(33) as functions of both
29
countriestax rates as follows (see Appendix):
Uh (h; f ) = ~{h +  
 
 (h; f )

+
1

ln

1  If   
1 + h

; (45)
Uf (h; f ) = ~{f +  
 
 (h; f )

+
1

ln

1  If + 
1 + h
 
1   
1  If
1  Ih

; (46)
where ~{i are country-specic constants, the last terms in square brackets equal the re-
spective consumption propensities ci , and the term
 
 

  1

 
1   ln
 
1 + 

(47)
depends on both countries resource taxes (h; f ) through the equilibrium level of ,
given by (26). This new formulation of welfare curves yields an intuitive characterization
of Stackelberg equilibria, as shown below.
I. Home moves rst: Suppose that Homes government moves rst by choosing a
tax rate h. At the second stage, Foreign government observes h and reacts by setting
the tax rate
S2f = Bf (h) ;
which is the welfare-maximizing rate maxf given h. By Proposition 3, any situation in
which f = maxf necessarily implies an e¢ cient level of relative resource use  = = (1  ).
Substituting this outcome in (45), we obtain the welfare function that is relevant for
Homes government at the rst stage:
Uh(h; 
S2
f ) = ~{h +  


1  

+
1

ln

1  If   
1 + h

;
which depends on h exclusively through the last term in square brackets, which repre-
sents Homes consumption propensity. Since Uh(h; S2f ) is concave but always strictly
increasing in h, the only optimal choice for Home as a leader would be to set S1h = +1.
The intuition is that when Foreign is the last mover, relative resource use is stuck at
the e¢ cient level and the only instrument that Home has to increase its own utility in
the rst stage is to maximize rent extraction indenitely, eventually using an innite tax
rate. However, this solution would call for an innite Foreign tax rate too, in view of the
30
best-response function (41). Hence, when Home moves rst, no Stackelberg equilibrium
with nite tax rates exists. Interestingly, this conclusion is radically overturned when the
leader is Foreign government, as shown below.
II. Foreign moves rst: Suppose that Foreigngovernment moves rst by choosing
a tax rate f . At the second stage, Homes government observes f and reacts by setting
the tax rate
S2h = Bh (f ) ;
which corresponds to the welfare-maximizing rate maxh given f . By Proposition 3,
any situation in which h = maxh necessarily implies that the equilibrium level of relative
resource use is ine¢ ciently low. More precisely, as shown in the Appendix, the equilibrium
level  = S2 induced by Homes reaction to the Foreign tax rate f is
S2 (f ) =
   (Bh (f ))
1  + (Bh (f )) ;
dS2 (f )
df
> 0; (48)
where both the functions Bh () and  () are dened in expression (42) above. The in-
tuition behind the result dS2=df > 0 is that a higher Foreign tax rate (which, without
Homes reaction, would raise relative resource use) prompts Homes government to in-
crease its own tax rate in order to keep relative resource use at the desired, ine¢ ciently
low level. Combining these outcomes with expression (46), we obtain the welfare function
that is relevant for the Foreigngovernment in the rst stage:
Uf (Bh (f ) ; f ) = ~{f +  
 
S2 (f )

+
1

ln

1  If + 
1 +Bh (f )
 
1   
1  If
1  Ih

: (49)
Expression (49) shows that the choice of f at the rst stage a¤ects Foreignwelfare
through two channels. On the one hand, choosing a higher f induces a higher relative
resource use S2 (f ) via Homes reaction, as established in (48). On the other hand,
choosing a higher f induces a higher tax in Home S2h = Bh (f ) which reduces Foreign
consumption propensity, as shown by the term in square brackets. These two e¤ects push
welfare Uf in opposite directions: the increase in S2 (f ) is always welfare-improving
because relative resource use gets closer to (without ever reaching) the e¢ cient level
31
desired by Foreign17, whereas the reduction in Foreignconsumption propensity reduces
present-value utility. The combination of these e¤ects implies that Uf (Bh (f ) ; f ) may
be a hump-shaped function of f and, hence, display a unique maximum associated to a
nite tax rate S1f . In the Appendix, we establish several properties of Uf (Bh (f ) ; f ),
including
d (S2(f ))
df
> 0 and
dcf (Bh(f ))
df
< 0. (50)
As a consequence of (50), the total derivative of the welfare function (49) includes one
positive and one negative term, namely
d
df
Uf (Bh (f ) ; f ) =
d
df
 
 
S2 (f )

| {z }
Positive
+
1

d
df
ln cf (Bh (f ))| {z }
Negative
(51)
so that it is generally possible to satisfy the rst order condition
d
df
Uf (Bh (f ) ; f ) = 0: (52)
The existence and uniqueness of an interior maximum satisfying (52) can be veried
numerically by assuming di¤erent combinations of parameter values. In this respect,
all our numerical simulations show that Uf (Bh (f ) ; f ) is infact hump-shaped and thus
exhibits a unique, nite S1f such that (52) holds. Figure 2, graph (a), depicts ve
examples obtained by varying the values taken by R&D productivities ('h; 'f ), the value
of the taste parameter for Home goods (), the values of production shares of intermediate
goods () and of the resource (). The diagrams show that a unique maximum point
exists in each case so that both S1f and the associated response 
S2
h = Bh(
S1
f ) are nite.
Since this result regularly holds in all our simulations (beyond the ve examples reported
in Figure 2), we conclude that
Proposition 6 When Foreign is the rst mover, there exists a unique Stackelberg equi-
librium (S1f ; 
S2
h ) with nite tax rates for a wide range of parameter values.
17This statement is formally proved in the Appendix: see expressions (A.66)-(A.67).
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Since we have shown that no Nash equilibrium exists and that no Stackelberg equilib-
rium exists when Homes government is the leader, Proposition 6 denes the benchmark
result for discussing behavioral predictions. In particular, assuming the existence of a
commitment device that forces governments to rule out innite tax rates which may
take the form of di¤erent mechanisms, as we argue in subsection 5.4 below  the only
feasible equilibrium appears to be a Stackelberg equilibrium in which Foreign sets a nite
tax rate S1f and Home sets the welfare-maximizing tax rate 
S2
h that implements the
desired, ine¢ ciently low level of relative resource use. Before discussing the interpreta-
tion of this result, we determine under what circumstances the Stackelberg equilibrium
is characterized by subsidies in Foreign along with positive taxes in Home.
5.3 Foreign Subsidies and Equilibrium Outcomes
A key motivation of our analysis is the lack of theoretical arguments explaining why
oil-rich countries subsidize domestic oil use while oil-poor economies typically tax oil
imports. The central question is thus whether these policies can be rationalized as a
strategic equilibrium outcome. Proposition 6 suggests one possible interpretation, namely
that governments obey a Stackelberg equilibrium (S1f ; 
S2
h ) where
S1f < 0 and 
S2
h > 0: (53)
There are indeed circumstances in which the inequalities (53) hold. Suppose that the
initial state of a¤airs is a laissez-faire equilibrium, and that the Home economy displays
a higher R&D productivity, 'h > 'f . We know from Proposition 5 that, in the absence
of strategic interactions, Foreign is tempted to subsidize whereas Home is tempted to tax
domestic resource use. In the Stackelberg game with strategic interaction, we obtain the
following results.
Assuming that Foreign moves rst, all the numerical simulations we performed show
that S2h > 0 generally holds whereas the sign of 
S1
f is crucially determined by the taste
parameter  according to a negative relationship: the higher is the taste for Home nal
goods in household preferences, the lower is S1f . For  su¢ ciently high, the Stackelberg
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equilibrium is characterized by the inequalities (53). The example reported in Graph (b)
of Figure 2 depicts four welfare curves (u0; u00; u000; u0000) respectively obtained by imposing
 = (0:50; 0:55; 0:60; 0:65) while holding all other parameters xed.18 The resulting equi-
libria exhibit S1f = (0:11; 0:23; 0:48; 0:66) and S2h = (1:63; 1:16; 0:80; 0:51). Hence,
in this example, all the values  > 1=2 determine Stackelberg equilibria in which Foreign
imposes a subsidy whereas Home levies a positive resource tax. Similar results hold in
all other simulations (not reported here), which leads us to conclude that
Proposition 7 Starting from a laissez-faire situation with a productivity gap 'h > 'f ,
if the taste for Home nal goods  is su¢ ciently high, the Stackelberg equilibrium is
characterized by a resource subsidy S1f < 0 in Foreign and a resource taxe 
S2
h > 0
in Home.
In all our simulations (not reported here), the threshold level of  above which S1f
turns negative tends to fall between 0:50 and 0:55. We note that  > 1=2 is empirically
plausible because resource-poor countries with high R&D productivity typically produce
consumption goods that capture higher shares of household consumption relative to the
nal goods produced by resource-rich economies displaying low R&D productivity.
5.4 Interpretation and Extensions
In order to interpret the Stackelberg equilibrium as a behavioral prediciton, there must
be a commitment device ensuring that both countries indeed choose (S1f ; 
S2
h ). The most
evident argument is suggested by the fact that, if innite tax rates are excluded by both
governments, then no Nash equilibrium exists and the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the
one in which Foreign moves rst. If innite tax rates are ruled out ex-ante, we can thus
imagine a one-shot game where each government is able to choose between being the
leader, being the follower, or move simultaneously, and conclude that the only feasible
18The other parameter values used to obtain the examples shown in graph (b) of Figure 2 are:  = 0:04,
a productivity gap 'h='f implying a 15% di¤erence in investment rates with Ih = 0:05 and If = 0:0425,
 = 0:5,  = 0:03. Variations in these parameter values do not qualitatively a¤ect our results.
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equilibrium is (S1f ; 
S2
h ). This reasoning is fairly general as it goes beyond the question
of which specic device actually induces both governmentscommitment. The natural
extension of this reasoning concerns the existence of self-enforcing commitment devices
when the taxation game is not one-shot but is rather a repeated one. In this respect,
the literature on repeated games suggests that a case of direct interest to our analysis
is the theory of wars of attrition (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991: Chapter 4). In this
framework, the playerspayo¤s include the expected costs of responding indenitely to
the opponents sequence of moves, which leads to an equilibrium where both players set
their choice variable in a forward looking manner and do not modify it afterwords. This
suggests recalling our previous results on everlasting wars in Figure 1 that extending
our tax game to include the expected (e.g.) political costs of modifying resource taxes
over time should create strategic equilibria with nite tax rates in view of a commitment
device endogenously determined by political costs. Tackling this issue is an interesting
topic for future research.
Another point that deserves further scrutiny is how national strategies may be a¤ected
in a multi-country environment where large and small countries coexist. In this paper,
we have considered national governments that are able to foresee the reaction of terms
of trade to their domestic tax policies. Introducing small price-taking countries in the
picture would create interactions with the strategies pursued by big trading economies,
which would open the door to further results in policy outcomes.
6 Conclusion
Asymmetric trade structures may provide national governments with di¤erent types of in-
centives to enact strategic taxes at the national level. Our analysis shows that, introducing
endogenous growth in a two-country model with uneven resource endowments, structural
gaps in productivity growth create asymmetric incentives to deviate from laissez-faire
equilibria. Stronger spillovers from past research in resource-poor economies exacerbate
the importerswillingness to tax resource use while prompting exporters to subsidize do-
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mestic consumption independently of the rent-extraction mechanism. In a strategic tax
game, the only equilibrium is of Stackelberg type and features, for a wide range of para-
meter values, positive exporterssubsidies and positive importerstaxes at the same time.
This scenario is consistent with the stylized facts that characterize world oil trade and,
in our view, deserves further scrutiny at both the theoretical and the empirical levels.
More generally, the argument that growth di¤erentials matter for strategic trade policies
is under-researched but highly relevant for policymaking, so that further research in this
direction is certainly desirable.
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A Appendix
This appendix contains the main proofs and derivations. Further proofs and detailed
derivations are available on-line as Supplementary Material.
Monopoly rents. Maximization of i (mi) = (P iX(mi)   &P iY ) Xi (mi) s.t. (3) gives
Xi (mi) = Xi =
n
2 (viLi)
 Ri [& (1 + bi)]
 1
o 1
1 
; (A.1)
i (mi) = i = (1  )P iXXi: (A.2)
Substituting (A.1) in (3) yields (4). For future reference, expressions (A.1) and (1) imply
Yi =
 
2=&
 
1   [1 + bi] 1 Mi (viLi)

1  (Ri)

1  : (A.3)
R&D sector. Denoting by Vi the value of a patent, the zero-prot condition is19
Vi = P
i
Y = [i (1 + ai)] : (A.4)
Denoting by ri the interest rate in country i, the no-arbitrage condition is
ri (t)Vi (t) = i (t) + _Vi (t) ; (A.5)
Derivation of (9)-(10). Maximize (8) subject to _Q =  R using the Hamiltonian
PRR  R, where  is the dynamic multiplier. The optimality conditions read
PR (t) =  (t) ; (A.6)
_ (t) = rf (t) (t) ; (A.7)
lim
t!1 (t)Q (t) e
  R1t rf (v)dv = 0; (A.8)
Plugging (A.6) in (A.7), we have (9). Integrating (A.7) and substituting the resulting
expression in (A.8), we have limt!1  (0)Q (t) = 0, which implies limt!1Q (t) = 0.
Integrating _Q (t) =  R (t) between time zero and innity thus yields (10).
19Aggregate prots of the R&D sector equal Vi _Mi   P iY Zi = ViiZi (1 + ai)  P iY Zi, so that condition
(A.4) maximizes R&D prots for a given marginal productivity i. Condition (A.4) can be equivalently
obtained assuming free entry in the R&D business (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
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Consumer problem (step 1). Maximization of (12) s.t. (13) implies
cfi =c
h
i =
1  

(P hY =P
f
Y ); (A.9)
P hY c
h
i =   Eci =Li and P fY cfi = (1  )  Eci =Li; (A.10)
ui = ln
("

(P hY )
(P fY )
1 

1  

1 #
 Eci =Li
)
; (A.11)
where (A.9) holds in each country i = h; f , expressions (A.10) follow from plugging (A.9)
in (13), and expression (A.11) follows from substituting (A.10) in (12). Denoting the term
in square brackets in (A.11) as ! = !(P hY ; P
f
Y ), indirect utility is ui = ln [!  (Eci =Li)] in
each country i = h; f .
Consumer problem (step 2). Individual wealth is (1=Li) times the value of all
domestic assets ViMi. Dening ni  (ViMi) =Li , the wealth constraints read
_nh = rhnh + P
h
L   (Ech=Lh)  Fh; (A.12)
_nf = rfnf + P
f
L   (Ecf=Lf )  Ff + PR (R=Lf ) ; (A.13)
where rini + P iL is income from assets and labor in country i, and PR (R=Lf ) is resource
income for each Foreign resident. Agents in country i maximize (14) subject to the
relevant constraint, (A.12) or (A.13), using consumption expenditure (Eci =Li) as control
variable. Denoting by i the multiplier, the optimality conditions Li=Ei = i and _i =
i (  ri) imply (15).
Derivation of (19). From (A.2) and (A.4), we have
i
Vi
= i
(1 + ai) (1  )P iXXi
P iY
= 'i  (1 + ai) (1  )
1 + bi
; (A.14)
where the last term follows from substituting i by (6) and
 
P iXMiXi

=
 
P iY Yi

=
= (1 + bi) by (3). Equations (A.4) and (6) yield Vi =
 
P iY Yi

= ['i Mi (1 + ai)], so
that
V^i (t) = P^
i
Y + Y^i   M^i: (A.15)
Substituting (A.14) and (A.15) in (A.5), we get
ri = 'i (1  ) (1 + ai) (1 + bi) 1 + P^ iY + Y^i   M^i: (A.16)
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Time-di¤erentiation of (A.3) yields
Y^i = M^i +

1  i +

1  R^i: (A.17)
Plugging (A.17) in (A.16), we obtain equation (19).
Propensities to spend. For future reference, dene the propensities
ci  Eci =
 
P iY Yi

; di  Edi =
 
P iY Yi

; xi  Exi =
 
P iY Yi

: (A.18)
Two equilibrium relationships characterize both countries. First, from (4), we have xi = 
P iY &MiXi

=
 
P iY Yi

= 
 
P iXMiXi

=
 
P iY Yi

, where we can substitute
 
P iXMiXi

=
 
P iY Yi

=
= (1 + bi) from (3) to obtain
xi = E
x
i =(P
i
Y Yi) = 
2 (1 + bi)
 1 for each i = h; f . (A.19)
Second, from (15), the growth rate of ci  Eci =
 
P iY Yi

equals
bci = ri (t)    P^ iY   Y^i = 'i (1  ) (1 + ai) (1 + bi) 1   M^i   ;
where we have substituted ri by (A.16). Plugging Edi  P iY Zi (1 + ai) in (7) and using
di  Edi =
 
P iY Yi

, the growth rate of varieties equals M^i = 'idi , which can be substituted
in the above expression to obtain
bci = 'i (1  ) (1 + ai) (1 + bi) 1   'idi    for each i = h; f . (A.20)
Derivation of (20). Consider Home. Using (A.18), and dening ~h   (1 + h) 1,
we can write (17) as
ch + 
d
h + 
x
h = 1  (PRRh) =

P hY Yh

= 1  ~h; (A.21)
where the last term follows from (2). A standard stability analysis based on (A.20) shows
that ch and 
d
h are constant and equal to (see proofs in the Supplementary Material)
ch = (1  ~h) 
'h

 (1  ) (1 + ah) + 2
   (1 + bh)
'h (1 + bh)
; (A.22)
dh = 1  ~h   ch   xh =
'h (1  ) (1 + ah)   (1 + bh)
'h (1 + bh)
: (A.23)
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Given (A.18), constant values of (ch; 
d
h; 
x
h) imply that P
h
Y Yh grows at the same rate as
all expenditure shares, E^ch = E^
d
h = E^
x
h . From (17) and (2), the ratio
Eh=P
h
Y Yh = (1  ~h) (A.24)
is constant, so that Homes growth rate is determined by the Keynes-Ramsey rule (15):
E^h = E^
c
h = P^
h
Y + Y^h = rh   : (A.25)
Now use (A.10) to eliminate P fY c
f
h and P
h
Y c
h
f from (16), obtaining
PRRh + (1  )Ech = Ecf : (A.26)
Substituting PRRh = ~hP hY Yh from (2), and E
c
h = 
c
hP
h
Y Yh from (A.18), we get
Ecf =
1

[~h + (1  ) ch]  P hY Yh; (A.27)
where the term in square brackets is constant, implying that Ecf=
 
P hY Yh

is constant.
Since P hY Yh grows at the same rate as E
c
h by (A.25), we have E^
c
f = E^
c
h. By the Keynes-
Ramsey rules (15), this implies rh = rf . Imposing rh = rf in (19) yields (20).
Derivation of (21). Combining the conditions (2) for Home and Foreign, we obtain
 (t) =
Rh (t)
Rf (t)
=
~h
~f
 P
h
Y (t)Yh (t)
P fY (t)Yf (t)
in each t 2 [0;1) ; (A.28)
where ~i   (1 + i) 1 is the tax-adjusted resource elasticity in nal production. Using
the denition Rh = Rf and condition (2) for country i = f , constraint (18) implies
Ef = P
f
Y Yf + PRRh = P
f
Y Yf + PRRf = P
f
Y Yf (1 + ~f) : (A.29)
Recalling denitions (A.18), result (A.29) and the central term in (18) imply cf+
x
f+
d
f =
1 + ~f, where we can substitute xf = 
2(1 + bf )
 1 from (A.19) to obtain
df = 1 + ~f  
2
1 + bf
  cf : (A.30)
Plugging (A.30) in (A.20) for country i = f we obtain
ccf = 'f  (1  ) (1 + af )1 + bf   'f

1 + ~f   
2
1 + bf
  cf

  : (A.31)
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Dividing both sides of (A.27) by P fY Yf and solving for 
c
f  Ecf=(P fY Yf ), we obtain
cf =
1

[~h + (1  ) ch] 
P hY Yh
P fY Yf
=
1

[~h + (1  ) ch] 
~f
~h
; (A.32)
where we have used (A.28) to get the last term. Next, dene
  1

+
1  

 
c
h
~h
> 1: (A.33)
Since ch is constant by (A.22),  is also constant and (A.32) implies
cf = ~f and ccf = ^: (A.34)
Substituting the second expression in (A.34) into (A.31) we obtain
^ (t) = 'f (  1) ~f   (t) + 'f

 (1  ) (1 + af ) + 2

(1 + bf )
 1   ('f + ) : (A.35)
Since 'f (  1) ~f > 0, equation (A.35) is globally unstable around ^ (t) = 0. Ruling
out explosive dynamics implying unbounded propensities to consume in Foreign, we have
 (t) =  in each t 2 [0;1), where  is the steady-state level in (A.35):
  ('f + ) (1 + f )  'f

 (1  ) (1 + af ) + 2

~f (  1)'f (1 + f ) : (A.36)
From (A.28), a constant  implies
P^ hY   P^ fY = Y^f   Y^h; (A.37)
where we can substitute (20) and (A.25) to obtain (21). Also note that, from (A.29), a
constant  also implies that Ef grows at the same rate as P
f
Y Yf , which coincides with the
growth rate of Eh and P hY Yh by (A.37) and (A.25). We thus have
E^h = E^f = ri    with rh = rf : (A.38)
Derivation of (22). Given PRRh = ~hP hY Yh, the Hotelling rule (9) and result (A.25)
imply that PRRh grows at the rate rh   , so that R^h =  . A constant  then implies
R^f =  , which proves (22).
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Derivation of (23). From (A.34), substitute cf = ~f  in (A.30) to obtain 
d
f =
1  21+bf   (  1) ~f , and eliminate (  1) ~f  by (A.36) to obtain
df =
'f (1  ) (1 + af )  (1 + bf )
'f (1 + bf )
: (A.39)
From (7), both countries exhibit M^i = 'idi , and results (A.39) and (A.23) imply (23).
Derivation of (24). Dening Ii  xi + di and substituting xi by (A.19) and di by
(A.23)-(A.39), we obtain (24).
Derivation of (25)-(26). Substituting the denition Ecf = 
c
fP
f
Y Yf in (A.27), we
have
P hY Yh
P fY Yf
=
cf
~h + (1  ) ch
: (A.40)
Substituting cf = 1+ ~f   xf   df from (A.30), ch = 1  ~h  xh  dh from (A.21), and
PhY Yh
P fY Yf
=
~f
~h
 from (A.28), equation (A.40) yields ~f~h
 =
(1 xf df )+~f 
(1 )(1 xh dh)+~h
, which can be
solved for  to get
 =
~h
~f
 (1  
x
f   df )
(1  )  1  xh   dh : (A.41)
Substituting Ii  xi +di in (A.41) and recalling that ~h~f =
1+f
1+h
, we get (26). Substituting
(26) in (A.28), we obtain (25).
Closed-form solutions. For future reference, the closed-form solutions for output
levels and prices are (see proofs in the Supplementary Material)
Yh (t) =
(2=&)

1 
1 + bh
Mh (0) (vh (0)Lh)

1 

Q0=
 
1 + 
 
1   e(
h )t; (A.42)
Yf (t) =
(2=&)

1 
1 + bf
Mf (0) (vf (0)Lf )

1 

Q0=
 
1 + 
 
1   e(
f )t; (A.43)
Yh (t) =Yf (t) = 

1    0  e(
h 
f)t; (A.44)
P hY (t) =P
f
Y (t) =

1   
1  If
1  Ih   
 1
0   

1   e (
h 
f)t; (A.45)
where we have dened  0 

Mh(0)
Mf (0)

1+bf
1+bh

vh(0)Lh
vf (0)Lf
 
1 

.
Conditional e¢ ciency: proof of result (28). See "Appendix B. Supplementary
Material".
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Derivation of (31). Expression (31) directly follows from (17)-(18).
Derivation of (32)-(33). Dening the constant i  (=Li) (1  )1  and recalling
that Eci = 
c
iP
i
Y Yi by (A.18), present-value utility (14) reads
Ui =
Z 1
0
e t  ln
"
i
ciP
i
Y Yi
(P hY )
(P fY )
1 
#
dt: (A.46)
Plugging the respective country indices, we obtain
Uh =
Z 1
0
e tln

h

P hY =P
f
Y
1 
chYh

dt and Uf =
Z 1
0
e tln
h
f

P fY =P
h
Y

cfYf
i
dt:
Substituting P hY (t) =P
f
Y (t) = [P
h
Y (0) =P
f
Y (0)]e
(
f 
h)t from (20), and Yi (t) = Yi (0) e(
i )t
from (21), and collecting the terms to isolate the initial values, we can dene
{h 
Z 1
0
e t  ln
h
e[
h +(1 )(
f 
h)]t
i
dt+
1

ln h;
{f 
Z 1
0
e t  ln
h
e[
f +(
h 
f )]t
i
dt+
1

ln f ;
and rewrite Uh and Uf as in (32)-(33).
Consumption propensities: derivation of (34)-(35). From (A.21), Homes con-
sumption propensity is dened as ch = 1   ~h  
 
dh + 
x
h

, where we can substitute
Ih = 
d
h + 
x
h from (A.22), as well as the denition of tax-adjusted resource elastic-
ity ~i   (1 + i) 1, to obtain (34). Considering Foreign, result (A.34) establishes
cf = ~f, where we can substitute the denition of  given in (A.33) to obtain
cf = ~f =

~f

+
1  

 ~f
~h
ch

 ;
and then substitute  with the equilibrium level  given in (26), obtaining
cf =
1
1  

1 + h
1  If
1  Ih + 
c
h 
1  If
1  Ih : (A.47)
Substituting ch by means of (34), equation (A.47) yields
cf =
1
1  

1 + h
1  If
1  Ih + (1  If ) 

1 + h
 1  If
1  Ih ;
which reduces to expression (35).
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Derivation of results (36)-(37). From (A.42), (A.43) and (A.45), we have
d lnYh (0)
dh
=

1   
d ln

=
 
1 + 

dh
=

1   
1
1 + 
 d ln

dh
< 0; (A.48)
d lnYf (0)
df
=

1   
d ln

1=
 
1 + 

df
=   
1   

1 + 
 d ln

df
< 0; (A.49)
d ln p0
dh
=   
1   
d ln 
dh
> 0; (A.50)
d ln p0
df
=   
1   
d ln 
df
< 0; (A.51)
where p0  P hY (0) =P fY (0). The signs in (A.48)-(A.51) come from d=dh < 0 and
d=df > 0 as implied by (26). These results imply the signs of terms-of-trade e¤ects and
physical-output e¤ects reported in (36)-(37). Considering the consumption-share e¤ect
in Home, expression (34) implies
d ln ch
dh
=
1
1 + h
 ~h
ch
=
1
1 + h
 ~h
1  ~h   Ih > 0; (A.52)
where the last term comes from substituting Ih = xh+
d
h in (A.22). In Foreign, equation
(35) implies
d ln cf
df
= 0: (A.53)
Proof of Proposition 3 (Foreign). Substituting (A.49) and (A.51) in (37), and
using d ln =df = (1 + f ) from (26), we have
  dUf
df
=
 (1 + f )
1   

 

1 + 

; (A.54)
the sign of which is determined by the term in square brackets. As  is monotonously
increasing in f by (26), the condition dUf=df = 0 is univoquely associated to a Foreign
tax maxf associated to a relative resource use 
max
f = = (1  ). The condition dUf=df =
0 identies a maximum of Uf because (A.54) implies dUf=df > 0 when  < = (1  )
and dUf=df < 0 when  > = (1  ).
Proof of Proposition 3 (Home). Substituting (A.48), (A.50) and (A.53) in (36),
  dUh
dh
=   (1  )
1   
d ln 
dh
+

1   
1
1 + 
 d ln

dh
+
1
1 + h
 ~h
1  ~h   Ih :
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From (26), we have dln =dh =   (1 + h) 1 and the above expression reduces to
  dUh
dh
=

1 + h


1
(1 + h) (1  ~h   Ih)  
1
1   

1
1 + 
  (1  )

; (A.55)
the sign of which is determined by the term in curly brackets: dening a (h)  1=
[(1 + h) (1  ~h   Ih)] and b (h)  11  
h
1
1+
  (1  )
i
, we have
  dUh
dh
=

1 + h

h
a (h) b (h)
i
: (A.56)
where a (h) is strictly decreasing in h and satises limh!1
a (h) = 0, while b (h)
is strictly increasing in h and satises limh!1
b (h) =

1  > 0. Therefore, Uh
is a hump-shaped function of h, with a unique maximum in h = maxh associated to
a (maxh ) = 
b (maxh ) !dUh=dh = 0. Consider any level hR of the Home tax such
that relative resource use is  = = (1  ): from (A.55) and (A.56), we have a  hR >
b
 
hR

= 0 and dUh=dh > 0. Hence, the condition dUh=dh = 0 is associated to a
resource tax maxh > 
h
R and a level of relative resource use 
max
h < = (1  ). For future
reference, we can express maxh as follows. From (A.55), the tax rate 
max
h is associated
to the condition
1 
1 + maxh

(1  ~h   Ih)
=
1
1   

1
1 + maxh
  (1  )

;
which, using the denition ~h   (1 + h) 1, may be equivalently written as
1
1 + maxh
= 1  + 1   
1 + maxh

(1  Ih)  
: (A.57)
The last term in (A.57) can be denoted as
 (maxh ) 
1   
1 + maxh

(1  Ih)  
> 0; (A.58)
which is strictly positive because this is necessary to have a positive propensity to consume
cf > 0 in Home (see (34) and the associated feasibility restriction (40) in the main text).
Using denition (A.58), we can solve (A.57) for maxh , obtaining
maxh =
   (maxh )
1  +   maxh  ; (A.59)
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which is indeed strictly less than = (1  ), as claimed before.
Proof of Proposition 4. Assuming  = = (1  ), we have dUf=df = 0 from
(A.54) and dUh=dh > 0 from (A.56).
Proof of Proposition 5. In a laissez-faire equilibrium,  is given by (27). If 'h = 'f
we have  = = (1  ), in which case dUf=df = 0 and dUh=dh > 0 by Proposition 4.
If 'h > 'f , we have  > = (1  ), implying dUf=df < 0 from (A.54) and dUh=dh > 0
from (A.55). If 'h < 'f , we have  < = (1  ), which implies dUf=df > 0 from (A.54)
whereas, from (A.56), the sign of dUh=dh is generally ambiguous.
Derivation of (41). From Proposition 3, Foreign government can maximize Uf for
given h by implementing a tax rate maxf that implies  =

1  . From this best-response
condition, substitute the denition of  given in (26), and set f = maxf , to obtain
maxf =
1  Ih
1  If  (1 + h)  1: (A.60)
Expression (A.60) denes maxf as a best response to any h so that we can substitute
maxf = 
B
f , and dene the right hand side as Bf (f ), obtaining expression (41) in the
text.
Derivation of (42). In Home, the welfare-maximizing tax rate maxh is associated to
the equilibrium level of relative resource use (A.59). Substituting maxh with the equilib-
rium level  given in (26), expression (A.59) yields
1 + f
1 + maxh
 
1   
1  If
1  Ih =
   (maxh )
1  +   maxh  ; (A.61)
where  (maxh ) is dened in (A.58). Expression (A.61) implicitly denes 
max
h as a best
response Bh(f ) to any f . Substituting maxh = 
B
h in the above expression, and solving
for f , we obtain expression (42) in the text, where the right hand side is the inverse best-
response functionB 1h (
B
h ). Being 
 
Bh

> 0, the term in curly brackets in (42) is strictly
below unity for any feasible nite value of Bh and converges to unity asymptotically as
h ! +1.
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Derivation of (45)-(46). From (32)-(33), welfare levels may be written as
Uh = {h +
1

ln

p1 0 Yh (0)
  ch	 ; (A.62)
Uf = {f +
1

ln

p1 0
Yf (0)
p0

 cf

; (A.63)
where the terms in square brackets have an identical core term that is a function of . To
see this, use the closed-form solutions (A.42), (A.43) and (A.45) evaluated at time t = 0
to obtain
Yh (0) = FH 
 
1 + 
 
1 
;
Yf (0)
p0
= FF 
 
1 + 
 
1 
;
p1 0 = Fp   

1  (1 );
where FH ;FF ;Fp are constants that do not depend on resource taxes. Plugging these
expressions into (A.62) and (A.63), and dening the country-specic constants ~{i 
{i + 1 lnFiFp for each country i = h; f we get
Ui = ~{i +
1

ln
( 
1 + 
 
1 
 ci
)
(A.64)
in each country i = h; f . From (A.64), we can dene the function  
 


as in (47), and
substitute the respective consumption propensities ci from (34)-(35) to obtain expressions
(45) and (46) in the text.
Derivation of (48). Substituting maxh with the best response function 
max
h (f ) =
Bh (f ), the equilibrium level of relative resource use  = maxh calculated in expres-
sion (A.59) directly yields S2 in the form of expression (48) in the text. From (42),
the functions Bh () and  () respectively exhibit B0h () > 0 and  ()0 < 0. This im-
plies dS2 (f ) =df > 0 because an increase in f increases Bh (f ), which then reduces
 (Bh (f )), which then increases S2 (f ).
Derivation of (50), (51) and Proposition 6. By denition (47), the function
 
 


is hump-shaped in  and exhibits a global maximum characterized by  0
 


= 0,
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which is associated to the e¢ cient level of relative resource use:20
argmax
fg
 
 


=

1   (A.65)
In expression (49), we have  
 
S2 (f )

where S2 (f ) is dened in (48) and is always
strictly lower than the e¢ cient level 1  . Therefore, any situation in which  = 
S2 (f )
implies that we are to the left of the maximum of  
 


and, hence,
@ 
 
S2

@S2
> 0;
@2 
 
S2

@ (S2)2
< 0; lim
S2! 
1 
@ 
 
S2

@S2
= 0: (A.66)
Combining results (A.66) with those established in (48) we have
d 
 
S2 (f )

df
> 0; lim
f!1
d 
 
S2 (f )

df
= 0: (A.67)
Now consider the welfare function (49), which depends on f via both  
 
S2 (f )

and
the last term, which represents the propensity to consume
1

ln cf =
1

ln

1  If + 
1 +Bh (f )
 
1   
1  If
1  Ih

; (A.68)
and displays the following properties21
dcf
df
=
@cf
@Bh
 @Bh (f )
@f
< 0; lim
f!1
dcf
df
= 0: (A.69)
The above properties imply the total derivative (51).
20Setting the derivative of function  () equal to zero yields the necessary condition  1
 
1 + 

= 
which reduces to (A.65). Note, in passing, that result (A.65) represents the basis for an alternative proof
of Proposition 3 since it implies that maxf is always associated to e¢ cient relative resource use.
21The sign of @Bh (f ) =@f is strictly positive from expression (42), which implies B0h () > 0.
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Figures
Figure 1: Best response functions for governments in a one-shot game with simultaneous
moves. Graph (a): non-existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Graph (b):
interpretation in terms of everlasting tax war.
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Figure 2: Stackelberg equilibria when Foreign moves rst. Graph (a): existence of equi-
libria for di¤erent combinations of parameter values. Graph (b): Stackelberg equilibria
calculated for di¤erent values of  display S1f < 0 for  = 0:55; 0:60; 0:65.
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